Sense and Substance in Wittgenstein"s Tractatus by Aalto, Maija
 9 
Sense and Substance in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
Maija Aalto, Joenssu 
1. Substance 
In the early pages of his Tractatus, Wittgenstein says that 
the substance of the world consists of unalterable, simple 
objects (Gegenstände) (2.021, 2.027). Substance is con-
nected to the Sinn of a proposition in the following cryptic 
way:  
“If the world had no substance, then whether a proposi-
tion had sense [Sinn] would depend on whether another 
proposition was true.” (2.0211)” 
“In that case we could not sketch any picture of the 
world (true or false).” (2.0212)  
How can the sense of a proposition depend on the exis-
tence of simple, unalterable objects? No connection be-
tween Sinn and substance is evident on the basis of these 
short remarks. Furthermore, the remarks sound strange 
because elsewhere in the Tractatus Wittgenstein makes it 
clear that we can understand the sense of a proposition 
without knowing anything about how things actually stand 
in the world (see e.g. 4.024). 
Let us begin by clarifying briefly the concept of ‘sub-
stance’. In addition to being made up of simple objects, it 
is said to be that which “subsists independently of what is 
the case” (2.024). This independence means that the 
substance of the world provides the building-blocks of all 
possible facts (of all situations that can “be the case”), but 
it has nothing to do with how those blocks are actually 
arranged into facts. In this light the tension between the 
demands that sense depends on substance and that 
sense is independent of facts resolves, since substance as 
such does not determine any particular facts, but provides 
merely the possibility of all situations (see TLP 2.014). 
2. Simple objects and determinate sense 
But why must the substance of the world be just like this? 
Why does it have to consist of objects that are simple? 
This demand flows from Wittgenstein’s view of language. 
Meaningful propositions are, according to him, bipolar: that 
is, they are either true or false descriptions of the world 
(there are no further truth-values), and each proposition 
can be true and can be false. For Wittgenstein, to deter-
mine the sense of a proposition is just to determine under 
what conditions we call the proposition true and under 
what conditions false, i.e. by determining its truth-condi-
tions. (See e.g. 2.21, 4.01, 4.023, 4.063, 4.2) 
The bipolarity of propositions leads to the requirement of 
determinate sense. If a proposition is to “restrict reality to 
two alternatives: yes or no” (4.023), it must be settled in 
connection with every state of affairs whether it makes the 
proposition true or false (and a bipolar proposition cannot 
‘agree’ nor ‘disagree’ with all states of affairs). But this 
division of all possible facts into two can happen only if the 
sense of a proposition is unambiguous, i.e. only if it is 
absolutely clear how things will have to stand if the propo-
sition is true, and (thereby) how they will have to stand if it 
is false. In other words, it must be clear which situation the 
proposition depicts, and this is clear when in the proposi-
tion there are exactly as many distinguishable parts as in 
the situation – when the two “possess the same logical 
(mathematical) multiplicity” (4.04). The logico-mathemati-
cal complexity of the depicted situation is not usually visi-
ble on the surface of our ordinary propositions; it is re-
vealed only when propositions are analysed into truth-
functions of elementary propositions. These are fully ana-
lysed propositions which depict atomic states of affairs and 
consist of combinations of simple names (4.21, 4.22). A 
name in Tractarian terminology means an element in a 
proposition that refers to an object: “A name means [be-
deutet] an object. The object is its meaning.” (3.203) The 
requirement that such simple signs are possible is the 
demand that sense be determinate (3.23), and sense must 
be determinate if the proposition is to be truly bipolar. 
Now if the fully analysed proposition consists of simple 
signs that refer to objects, then these referents must be 
logically simple as well. If they were complex in a way that 
characterised the sense of a proposition, then analysis 
would not be complete and the names would not be truly 
simple; the logico-mathematical complexity of the situation 
would not be clearly displayed in the proposition. On the 
other hand, the demand of bipolarity presupposes an end 
to analysis; for if the division of the world into simpler and 
simpler constituents went on infinitely, the truth-conditions 
of our propositions could never be settled. So if we want 
our propositions to be true or false descriptions of the 
world, the world must have a determinate structure which 
our (analysed) propositions has to reflect – that is, the 
substance of the world must consist of simple objects 
which are the referents of names in elementary proposi-
tions. 
3. Sinn and Bedeutung in Frege  
and Wittgenstein 
The demand of determinate sense explains why objects 
(the referents of names) have to be simple. But why should 
it be impossible to form any pictures at all if there were no 
substance of the world, as Wittgenstein claims in 2.0211-
2? To make sense of this rather radical claim we need to 
turn to the obvious target behind Wittgenstein’s remarks, 
namely, to Frege and his theory of Sinn and Bedeutung.  
In Frege’s Über Sinn und Bedeutung the sense of a 
proposition is not linked in the same way with truth and 
falsity as it is in Wittgenstein’s theory (where the sense of 
a proposition and its two poles form a whole that cannot be 
conceptually separated). This is because for Frege, the 
Sinn of a proposition (the thought it expresses) is inde-
pendent of the Bedeutungen of its component parts. Thus, 
a proposition can be meaningful even if it contains proper 
names that are ‘empty’, i.e. if it contains names that lack a 
referent in reality. This is to be regarded as an imperfection 
that is quite common in ordinary language: there we often 
encounter symbols (or combinations of symbols) that are 
bedeutungslos (Frege 1892a, 163). It is an imperfection 
because such empty symbols render the propositions in 
which they occur truth-valueless; they cannot be said to be 
either true or false. However, the important point for us is 
that in Frege’s theory even truth-valueless propositions 
can have Sinn: they can express thoughts that can be 
grasped. According to Frege,  




“[i]f it were a question only of the sense of the sentence, 
the thought, it would be needless to bother with the Be-
deutung of a part of a sentence; only the sense, not the 
Bedeutung, of the part is relevant to the sense of the 
whole sentence. The thought remains the same whether 
‘Odysseys’ [in the sentence ‘Odysseys was set ashore 
at Ithaca while sound asleep’] has a Bedeutung or not.” 
(Frege 1892a, 157)  
Disregard for the Bedeutung of a name is possible for 
Frege because in his theory names always have senses, 
even if they fail to refer to objects; thus, as long as all the 
names (and predicates) in a proposition have senses, the 
whole proposition has sense. Of course, Frege admits, 
when we want to find out the truth of some sentence, then 
“we also have to inquire after Bedeutungen; we have to 
throw aside proper names that do not designate or name 
an object, though they may have a sense” (Frege 1892b, 
178). In other words, the question whether names have 
Bedeutungen or not becomes relevant when we are inter-
ested in the truth-values of our propositions, but it is not 
relevant when we are concerned with the senses or 
thoughts that our propositions express.  
Now in logic and in science we are, according to Frege, 
concerned with the realm of truth rather than with the 
realm of sense; therefore in logic it should be guaranteed 
that all our names really refer to objects (so that we can 
avoid truth-valueless propositions). This means that in 
logic we cannot rely only on the Sinn of a proposition, for, 
as we saw, in Frege’s theory the sense of a proposition is 
separated from the Bedeutungen of its constituent parts: 
even if a proposition as a whole has Sinn, its names may 
lack a reference. How can we guarantee that names al-
ways have a reference (and that propositions have a truth-
value)? One way is to rely on the truths of other proposi-
tions which assert that the names we use really refer to 
objects. For example, to be sure that ‘A is F’ is either true 
or false, we presuppose first that the proposition ‘A exists’ 
is true. To use Frege’s own example, it depends on the 
truth of the proposition ‘There was someone who discov-
ered the elliptic form of the planetary orbits’ whether the 
expression ‘whoever discovered the elliptic form of plane-
tary orbits’ refers to an object or only seems to do so 
(Frege 1892a, 163). If this expression is bedeutungslos, 
then the whole proposition in which it functions as a proper 
name – ‘Whoever discovered the elliptic form of the 
planetary orbits died in misery’- is neither true nor false. 
The presupposition that the proper name designates 
something is just as much included in the positive as in the 
negative assertion (‘Whoever discovered the elliptic form 
of planetary orbits did not die in misery’) (see ibid.). We 
could capture Frege’s position by saying that in order to 
connect the proposition to a truth-value he needs to rely on 
the truth of some other proposition. But from Wittgenstein’s 
point of view this means that the sense of a proposition 
depends in such cases on the truth of another proposition; 
for to have sense is for Wittgenstein to be a true or a false 
picture of the world. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
Wittgenstein has Frege in mind in 2.0211 where he talks of 
the case where “whether a proposition had sense would 
depend on whether another proposition was true.”  
But if the sense of a proposition depends on the truth of 
another proposition, why should this make it impossible to 
“sketch any pictures of the world (true or false)” (TLP 
2.0212)? This claim of Wittgenstein’s starts to make sense 
if we take him to be reading Frege so that it is always 
possible that names lack referents. This logical possibility 
(which opens up when the Sinn of a proposition is sepa-
rated from the Bedeutungen of its constituent parts) can, 
namely, lead to an infinite regress of propositions guaran-
teeing each others truth-values, which would indeed make 
it impossible to sketch true or false pictures of the world. 
Let us see how this can happen. We saw that if we want to 
be sure that the proposition ‘Whoever discovered the 
elliptic form of planetary orbits died in misery’ is unambi-
guously either true or false, we need to know first the truth 
of the proposition ‘There was someone who discovered 
the elliptic form of planetary orbits’. But how can we be 
sure that this latter proposition is either true or false? Do 
we not need to know first the truth of a third proposition – 
such as ‘Planets have orbits’ or ‘There are planets’ or ‘The 
Earth exists’ – before we can decide whether the condi-
tional proposition is true or false or rather has no truth-
value at all? The problem, in short, is this: a proposition 
which asserts that some proper name has a referent itself 
contains names which might be empty, and we need new 
propositions to assert that these names have referents; but 
these new propositions, too, may contain names whose 
Bedeutungen must be secured by new propositions, etc. 
Now either this chain of ‘back-up’ propositions goes on 
infinitely (for each new proposition contains at least one 
name of which something is predicated, and this name has 
a Sinn but not necessarily a Bedeutung, which must be 
asserted by a new proposition) and we can never connect 
our propositions to reality, or we must forestall the regress 
by stipulating that at some point the Sinn and Bedeutung 
of a name coincide. This move would be no less undesir-
able for Frege since it seems to abolish the distinction 
between sense and reference of a name altogether.  
These problems can be avoided if propositions contain-
ing empty names are not allowed to have Sinn at all. This 
is Wittgenstein’s solution in the Tractatus: if some con-
stituent part in a proposition lacks a Bedeutung, the whole 
proposition lacks Sinn. As he says, “if [a proposition] has 
no sense [Sinn], that can only be because we have failed 
to give a meaning [Bedeutung] to some of its constituents.” 
(5.4733) The regress that threatens when the sense of a 
proposition is separated from the referents of names is 
thus blocked at the outset by demanding that all names in 
a meaningful (elementary) proposition must have objects 
as their Bedeutungen, and that these names simply stand 
for these objects without a mediating ‘sense’ (on whose 
mediation we can never count). This in its turn requires of 
the world that its substance consists of simple, unalterable 
objects: then our propositions can divide it uniquely into 
two (they can be truly bipolar) and the referents for our 
names are secured without any further conditions.  
It should be noted that Wittgenstein’s demand that all 
names must have simple and unalterable objects as their 
Bedeutungen does not mean that we cannot talk mean-
ingfully about non-existent things or situations. In ordinary 
language we often use names that refer to things that do 
not exist. Nevertheless, we are able to understand many of 
the propositions in which such names occur, and their truth 
or falsity can be settled. This suggests that such names 
are in fact abbreviations of more complex descriptions 
which consist of simpler elements and which can be true or 
false. The real function of such a name is not, then, to 
‘stand for an object’ but to describe a complex, and the 
‘emptiness’ of the name means only that the elements of 
which the complex consists are not so combined as the 
analysed proposition presents them to be. Thus, “[a] 
proposition that mentions a complex will not be nonsensi-
cal, if the complex does not exists, but simply false” (3.24). 
But the parts of this complex must exist; in other words, 
the simple names into which the complex name is ana-
lysed must have the subsistent, unalterable objects as 
their Bedeutungen, if the proposition as a whole is to have 
Sinn. Here the influence of Russell’s ‘theory of descrip-
tions’ on Wittgenstein is clearly visible. 




4. Concluding remarks 
I have argued, after a brief clarification of the concept of 
‘substance’, that Wittgenstein’s radical claim that “if the 
world had no substance, then whether a proposition had 
sense would depend on whether another proposition was 
true” (2.0211), in which case “we could not sketch any 
picture of the world” (2.0212), is understandable against 
the background of Frege’s theory of Sinn and Bedeutung. 
Granted that this is so, it is natural to ask: whose view of 
sense is preferable, Wittgenstein’s or Frege’s? I shall end 
by indicating briefly some factors which should be taken 
into account when deciding this question.  
We saw that Frege’s separation of sense from reference 
is problematic, since it makes possible the infinite regress 
of propositions guaranteeing other propositions’ truth-
value. Wittgenstein does not want to let the regress begin; 
therefore he connects the sense of a proposition to the 
substance of the world in the remarks I started with. Thus, 
it seems that if we demand that all meaningful propositions 
must have a truth-value (and, moreover, that each mean-
ingful proposition must be capable of being true and capa-
ble of being false), then Wittgenstein’s view of sense is to 
be chosen. Yet Frege’s view has its attractions. For exam-
ple, his view of propositions is closer to common sense 
than Wittgenstein’s austere view, when it lets truth-value-
less propositions, too, inside the realm of meaningful 
language. After all, didn’t Wittgenstein himself teach us in 
his later writings that what we call a ‘proposition’ is a vari-
ety of more or less closely related things, and not just 
those linguistic entities which can be said to be true or 
false? However, before discarding the Tractarian view 
simply because it is foreign to common sense, we should  
 
 
see what led Wittgenstein to reject Frege’s theory in the 
first place. As far as I can see, the initial reason is his 
dissatisfaction with the account of logic Frege advances, 
and the demand of the essential bipolarity of propositions 
is a consequence of this dissatisfaction. Thus, when de-
ciding the question whose view of sense is preferable, 
Frege’s or the early Wittgenstein’s, one important task 
(which it is impossible to undertake here) is to compare the 
merits and faults of the views of logic Frege and Wittgen-
stein advance. 
The second important task is to check whether Wittgen-
stein’s reading of Frege can be sustained. Wittgenstein 
may not have studied Frege’s texts as carefully as is often 
supposed, and his understanding of Frege’s doctrines may 
have been affected by Russell’s reading of Frege. Perhaps 
Wittgenstein did not have an accurate grasp of Frege’s 
theory of sense and reference? This is an interesting issue 
which is currently much debated in commentary literature. 
However, my aim here has only been to view Frege’s 
distinction of sense and reference through Tractarian 
glasses, whether the lenses distort reality or not.  
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